The Trump administration faces criticism for temporarily lifting sanctions on Iranian oil. Critics argue that Washington provided Tehran with a significant economic advantage, but these claims often ignore crucial details.
Opponents assert that the administration should amend the waiver by directing Iranian oil revenues into escrow accounts, a move Iran would likely reject. While this approach sounds assertive, it risks undermining the agreement that helped reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomacy involves achieving practical, not perfect, outcomes.
The agreement made between the U.S. and Iran includes concessions that some Americans find unacceptable. One such concession is the temporary lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil. The focus should not solely be on how Iran benefits from this deal but rather whether these benefits are significant enough to endanger the agreement. The current understanding allowed partial traffic restoration through the Strait of Hormuz.
Misconceptions abound regarding Iran’s supposed access to new oil revenues. In reality, Iran has been selling significant quantities of oil despite sanctions, primarily to China. The sanctions relief did not create new sales; it enhanced revenue from existing sales by allowing higher prices and reducing costs associated with evasion.
Estimates suggest that for the initial 60-day waiver, Iran might gain $1.5 billion more than it would have with sanctions in place. While not insignificant, this amount falls short of critics’ projections. Foreign policy requires balancing costs and benefits, beyond identifying disliked aspects.
The proposed alternative involves requiring Iranian oil revenues in escrow accounts. This assumes Iran’s compliance, an unlikely scenario. Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz to resume exports, not to surrender earnings under U.S. control. Critics compare feasible agreements with unrealistic alternatives.
The real decision lies between an acceptable deal for Iran and no agreement at all. Attempting to change terms post-factum might drive Iran to close the Strait again. Such actions neglect the broader achievements of preventing disruptions in key oil transit routes.
Reopening the Strait involved necessary concessions. Unrealistic to expect a unilateral dictation of terms to Iran, stability required compromise. The modest rise in Iranian oil revenues pales compared to the benefits of keeping the Strait open.
The ideal balance in diplomacy considers feasible choices over favorable fantasies. Revisiting negotiations over negotiated terms delays progress. Often, the choice is between an imperfect agreement and no agreement, not between good and bad deals.
Brett Erickson, managing principal of Obsidian Risk Advisors and advisory board member at the Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and International Relations and DePaul University Driehaus College of Business, presents this analysis. © 2026 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved.
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