Operation Spiderweb in Ukraine demonstrated a significant shift in military capabilities. By launching internet-connected drones from within Russia, Ukrainian forces showcased a level of precision typically reserved for major military powers. These drones, controlled remotely from within Ukraine, destroyed strategic Russian aircraft. This operation highlights the increasing accessibility of precision strikes.
The current battlefield is undergoing transformation, reminiscent of the changes brought by rockets and missiles. New technologies have emerged, changing how military entities view warfare. Previously, drones were categorized into two: short-range, radio-controlled drones and long-range, inflexible drones. This is changing with two key advancements.
First, fiber-optic drones offer secure control through physical links over 5 to 20 kilometers. Their range, however, is limited by the fiber length. More crucial is the rise of cellular drones. These drones, using cellular or internet-based systems, can cover vast distances, navigate low altitudes to avoid detection, and strike with high precision.
In Ukraine, evidence suggests cellular drones operate across hundreds or even 1,000 kilometers. This is beyond the limits of fiber-optic systems. What makes cellular technology especially risky is its accessibility. Unlike expensive satellite systems, cellular connectivity relies on common components like modems and SIM cards, offering high performance at low cost.
Where there’s cell coverage, these drones can be controlled and redirected to precise targets. Operators can be located far from both launch and impact sites. This blurs the lines between battlefields and civilian areas, making cellular drones a strategic issue rather than a mere tactical problem. The technology now allows states, militias, terrorist groups, and criminal networks to access capabilities once limited to state actors.
The threat isn’t hypothetical. Russia has used such drones against Ukraine and supplies weapons to hostile entities like Iran. China’s capabilities should also be considered. As the technology spreads, the potential for offensive operations against democratic societies increases.
Democracies face challenges due to their open systems. Authoritarian regimes can shut down networks easily, ignoring civil liberties. Democracies, however, operate under far greater restrictions. Even attempted network shutdowns can provide attackers strategic advantages, causing disruption without a direct hit.
Israel’s experience offers cautionary lessons. The threat from Hamas’s tunnels wasn’t about their visibility but about underestimating their strategic impact. Similarly, fiber-optic drones on the Lebanese border were identified but not effectively countered. Successful response to cellular drones requires quicker recognition and adaptation cycles.
Western nations must enhance intelligence cooperation to map the spread of these technologies. Ukraine serves as a critical learning ground for developing countermeasures. Beyond gathering intelligence, Western countries need systems to detect and counter drones that utilize cellular networks. Drones exhibit unique communication patterns that can be monitored for early detection.
Technology alone isn’t enough. Western countries need operational readiness with effective doctrines and faster procurement processes. Partnerships with the private sector can expedite solutions. The urgency is underscored by Russia’s repeated drone strikes despite being a nuclear power.
As cellular drones make civilian infrastructure a viable battleground, Western democracies must prepare their responses swiftly. The capability exists; the challenge lies in timely adaptation.
Or Horvitz, a former Israeli Defense Intelligence officer, served 18 years, including leading intelligence efforts against Hezbollah.
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